A synthetic risk transfer, through either insurance or a financial guarantee, would mitigate CMHC’s credit risk exposure while allowing it to build a foundation for a deeper mortgage securitization market. CMHC would need to work with the industry to define new mortgage pool types.
Does this create an increased exposure to loss for CMHC and taxpayers? Providers of these risk transfer solutions would need to have expertise in this space. Since banks and US housing agencies already use these tools, there is a pool of experienced parties available. What about the timely payment guarantee risk? Certainly, work would need to be done to quantify this risk. However, given that CMHC has never had a claim on its timely payment guarantee, we expect any incremental risk would be minimal.
But why should CMHC do this? There are three key reasons:
Mandate fulfillment. CMHC has a mandate to promote the efficient functioning and competitiveness of the housing finance market and contribute to the stability of the financial system, including the housing market. Expanding the mortgage securitization market through new credit risk transfer mechanisms allows for a broader housing finance market. This increases demand for mortgage securitization and helps to develop a broader investor base that will eventually support a private sector securitization solution.
Attract private sector capital. To expand housing, we need to build a broad housing finance market that will attract private sector capital. Much of our national housing strategy relies on government funding. This solution aims to create greater scope for institutional investors to fund residential mortgages.
Transfer credit risk. Developing a market for credit risk transfer in the mortgage market lays the foundation for the government to transfer mortgage insurance credit risk to the private sector.
This strategic approach not only aligns with CMHC’s mandate but also paves the way for a more resilient and expansive housing market in Canada.